Corporate governance, information asymmetry, and firm performance : a panel study of Thailand | |
| Author | Kobsidthi Silpachai |
| Call Number | AIT Diss. no.DBA-SOM-24-07 |
| Subject(s) | Corporate governance--Thailand Business ethics |
| Note | A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration |
| Publisher | Asian Institute of Technology |
| Abstract | This study intends to assess the influence of corporate governance (CG) and information asymmetry (IA) on firm performance (FP). We applied 3SLS (Three-Stage Least Squares) estimators to examine the relationships among (1) internal CG mechanism and FP, (2) internal CG mechanism and IA, and (3) IA and FP. The information used in this study was obtained from secondary sources such as Bloomberg and SETSMART. The period of data collection was for nine years, from 2014 to 2022, with a dataset of 3,692 firm-year observations of companies registered on the Thailand Stock Exchange. Our study finds that internal CG mechanisms (board size, board independence, institutional ownership, dividend policy, and financial leverage) are positively associated with FP. Secondly, CG mechanisms are positively associated with analyst coverage (and hence inversely related to IA). This finding suggests that internal CG mechanisms augment corporate transparency and reduce agency costs and adverse selections. Thirdly, IA is inversely related to FP, i.e., more transparent firms with greater analyst coverage tend to deliver better FP as monitoring costs and adverse selection are reduced. We found that additional analyst coverage is linked with an increase of a firm's ROE by 0.5201%, its ROA by 0.0767%, and its PBR by 0.0453 times. Fourthly, we further conducted an interaction effect analysis of CG and IA on FP and found that IA also significantly moderates the association between CG and FP. Furthermore, this research finds a curvilinear association between board size and FP, whereby our empirical results suggest that the ideal board size is around 9 and 10 members. Additionally, this study provides a ranking of effective CG mechanisms: dividend policy, leverage, and board size, followed by a tie between board independence and institutional ownership. Practical implications from our study are also discussed. |
| Year | 2024 |
| Type | Dissertation |
| School | School of Management |
| Department | Other Field of Studies (No Department) |
| Academic Program/FoS | Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration (Publication code = DBA-SM, SM) |
| Chairperson(s) | Levermore, Roger; |
| Examination Committee(s) | Supasith Chonglerttham;Chotchai Charoenngam; |
| Degree | Thesis (Ph.D.) - Asian Institute of Technology, 2024 |